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Introduction
“A necessitous man is not a free man,” in his 1944 State of the Union
Address, Franklin Delano Roosevelt made this bold claim, and, in the process, he
upended the basis of the American liberal democratic order.1 Our political tradition has
always placed the most importance on political rights, and the founders created a
Constitution which protected the people from government excess and gave them political
power. They also included a Bill of Rights to secure specific political protections for
citizens of their new nation. Roosevelt’s claim about necessity and freedom doesn’t seem
to fit neatly into this picture of the American constitutional order. Many of the most
prominent American political rights are specific guarantees of political liberty, but
Roosevelt changed the discourse around rights to focus on economic claims. He argued
that our vaunted political liberty was contingent on eliminating economic necessity: “true
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence”. 2
Roosevelt’s language of rights promising a minimal level of economic security was new,
but the idea of republicanism having economic preconditions is an old one. The
American founders saw their project as contingent on a robust middle class, and the
second bill is a direct attempt to continue that tradition.3 Ultimately, Roosevelt’s belief in
economic rights was founded on a broad truth about liberal democracies: securing
political rights is not enough to ensure a prospering republican form of government. The
economic conditions of a people are inexorably intertwined with their ability to be full
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democratic citizens. Governments must ensure a baseline level of economic security to
allow their citizens to exercise their political rights.
There are two fundamental issues with the American constitutional order that a
rights-based approach to economic issues seeks to address. The first problem is a moral
one that is most easily proffered in the form of a question, why does the richest society in
the history of the world let so many of its people live in poverty? Phrasing this problem
as a question forces anyone who would oppose government action to lift up the least
fortunate to justify that choice on moral grounds. Cass Sunstein argues that this moral
argument was the driving impetus for Roosevelt’s domestic crusades.4 Sunstein writes of
Roosevelt’s thought that to him, “human distress could no longer be taken as an
inevitable by-product of life, society or ‘nature’; it was an artifact of social policies and
choices. Much human misery is preventable. The only question is whether a government
is determined to prevent it” 5. Further elaborating on Roosevelt’s thought, Roosevelt’s
Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins said: “Foremost was the idea that poverty is
preventable, that poverty is destructive, wasteful, demoralizing, and that poverty is
morally unacceptable in a Christian and democratic society” 6. The moral argument,
couched in these terms, seems difficult to dispute. Obviously, the portion of the argument
that places the onus for rectifying the injustice of poverty on government action is where
the disagreement resides. The juxtaposition of the United States’ great wealth against the
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misery of poverty is meant to undermine the notion that state action would be impractical
or unnecessary.

The second fundamental issue that an economic rights approach addresses is what
Sunstein calls “The material preconditions of citizenship”7. Men who don’t meet the
material preconditions cannot fully exercise their political capabilities. These
preconditions usually aren’t stated outright, but they are understood to be a level of
economic security that allows individuals to self-govern. That is, they are secure enough
in their lives to exercise their political judgments without being compelled by economic
necessity. John Rawls included a similar notion as part of his ordering of a just liberal
society in Political Liberalism, “the first principle covering the equal basic rights and
liberties may easily be preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens’
basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens to
understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise those rights and liberties”8. This
understanding of material preconditions and basic needs isn’t just a modern conception. It
is also tightly connected to the notion of freedom and liberty in the American tradition.
At the time of the founding, property ownership was a condition of suffrage because it
was the ultimate mark of the self-sufficiency that defined the American citizen.9 Sunstein
describes this in simple terms, “Citizens who do not have a decent minimum cannot
participate in politics; those without security cannot easily be citizens at all”10. Broad
participation in the process of democracy is important for the healthy functioning of
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republican government, but for that broad participation to be helpful it must also be
meaningful. The economically insecure would not be able to exercise their freedoms
meaningfully for both practical and systemic reasons. On the practical side, the
economically insecure wouldn’t be able to afford time off to vote, they wouldn’t have
time to devote to understanding the issues of the day, and they could be influenced by the
choices of economic superiors. The broader systemic issue would be that the
economically disadvantaged would have comparatively less power, even if they were
able to participate in the political process. There is an emerging body of research that
shows that the policy preferences of the wealthy, in this case the top 10% of Americans,
differ from the preferences of the majority of Americans, and yet they are
disproportionately enacted by the government.11 A robust conception of economic rights
would increase the political power of the middle and lower class majority by freeing them
from the shackles of economic insecurity. By addressing the fundamental issue of
material preconditions, economic rights can also be a victory for the moralists, but the
argument is more compelling when it doesn’t rest exclusively on an absolute moral case.
The rest of this thesis will focus on both issues and how economic rights intersect with
them in various ways.

Chapter One will give a detailed explanation of the concept of an economic right
and provide a brief history of economic rights in the American Constitutional tradition.
Economic rights have always been the less heralded sibling of more widely understood
civil and political rights. The popular conception of rights doesn’t usually include
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economic guarantees, and opponents of economic rights will often make the argument
that they aren’t even rights at all. The root of this dispute is in the distinction between
positive and negative liberties, and the role of government in providing and securing
those liberties. These conflicts are particularly pronounced in the American tradition,
where economic rights have historically had little purchase. Abroad, economic rights
have more stature, and the United Nations has promoted economic rights on the same
level as civil and political rights in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights.12 The
examination of economic rights in Chapter One will lay the groundwork for Chapter
Two’s discussion of the most well-known appearance of economic rights in American
history.
Chapter Two will examine the specifics of Roosevelt’s second bill of rights
proposal, how it came to be, and the broader justification for this idea demonstrated in
Roosevelt’s other writings. Roosevelt articulated eight specific economic rights in his
1944 State of the Union address:
“The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or
mines of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give
him and his family a decent living;
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of
freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or
abroad;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good
health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness,
accident, and unemployment;
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The right to a good education.”13
Listed here, most of them are relatively familiar to the American citizen. Many of them
have been enacted by the government or have been the source of political contention.
However, since Roosevelt’s time they haven’t necessarily been so explicitly connected to
a larger conception of economic rights. Roosevelt saw these promises as a way of
promoting a general personal security in the face of life’s risks, and by providing that
security he was also securing a true sense of freedom for each citizen.14 In Roosevelt’s
parlance, all of these rights could be seen as the specific fulfilment of an earlier promise
he made during his famous “Four Freedoms” speech. Among the four freedoms he
promised in response to the prevailing dangers of the fascist world was a “freedom from
want”.15 Of the four claims, this may have been the most ambitious, and his stated goal
was “economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life
for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world”16. Each right that he listed in his 1944
address was meant to build into a cohesive whole that would collectively secure the
ability of every American to be truly free. Sunstein also points to the character of the
second bill of rights, and its combination of government action with the idea of liberty, as
being a fundamental rejection of the idea of American anti-government individualism.
He said that “[The Second Bill] marked the utter collapse of the (ludicrous) idea that

Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress, “Second Bill of Rights Speech,” January
11, 1944, The American Presidency Project, accessed April 7, 2019,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/210825.
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freedom comes from an absence of government”17. By so intimately connecting the role
of government to the promotion of liberty, Roosevelt flipped the script on those who
would argue that increased government activity constrains liberty. The entire basis of the
economic bill of rights is government action promoting liberty. The arguments of both his
1944 State of the Union and his broader thoughts on the topic remain persuasive to this
day. Their enduring relevance is, perhaps surprisingly, not reflected in American political
discourse, but rather abroad. After Franklin Roosevelt’s death in 1944, Eleanor Roosevelt
was instrumental in the passage of the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights,
which was heavily influenced by the ideas of FDR’s second bill of rights.18
Chapter Three will examine the different ways an economic bill of rights could be
implemented. The name “bill of rights” seems to immediately suggest that new promises
of an economic minimum would be introduced as full new constitutional rights via the
Article V amendment procedure. The rights could be introduced via a single amendment
that codified a right to be free of want, or each specific guarantee could be added as
individual amendments. On its face, such a dramatic transformation of the actual
constitutional text seems far-fetched, and in the case of economic rights there is also a
huge question surrounding judicial enforcement of those rights. For those reasons,
Roosevelt specifically maintained that he wasn’t trying to propose actual amendments to
the Constitution.19 Instead, Roosevelt was hoping to change the fundamental political
understandings of the nation to include support for economic rights. Sunstein calls these
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understandings “constitutive commitments,” and he defines them as such, “they have a
special place in the sense that they are widely accepted and cannot be eliminated without
a fundamental change in social understandings” 20. The most widely recognized instance
of constitutive commitments can be found in the Declaration of Independence. That
document is not a binding legal text in the way the Constitution is, but it retains a
privileged position in our nation’s political understanding. Indeed, no American would
dispute that we are committed to the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
yet nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights are these things explicitly stated. In that
same way, Roosevelt was seeking to alter the political fabric of the country to accept
basic economic rights as a fact of our democratic system.
Conveniently, such an approach also sidesteps the more difficult questions surrounding
judicial enforcement that would arise from specific textual guarantees of economic rights.
Constitutive commitments would be enforced via the democratic process. Citizens would
support politicians and proposals that are in line with the commitments, rather than courts
striking down laws or mandating action to guarantee constitutionally provided economic
rights. Both the constitutive commitments path and the constitutional rights path are valid
options for implementing an economic bill of rights, and their drawbacks and benefits
would have to be closely weighed against one another. Roosevelt came down on the side
of commitments, but other countries whose constitutions have been inspired by the UN
convention on human rights include enforceable economic claims in their constitutions.21

20
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The concluding chapter of this thesis will expand the idea of economic rights to
explore why it is beneficial to approach societies problems on an economic rights basis.
The chapter will include a presentation of a list of potential modern economic rights that
would be an appropriate continuation of the legacy of Roosevelt’s Second Bill.
modern economic rights that would be an appropriate continuation of the legacy of
Roosevelt’s Second Bill.

9

Chapter One: Economic Rights and the American Tradition
Late night talk shows often include a “man on the street” segment where
unsuspecting passersby are subjected to difficult questions about culture or politics. It’s
easy to imagine one such interview where the person is asked to describe rights. A typical
high school graduate with at least some education in civics would probably mention
something about the US Constitution and its Bill of Rights. They may even name a few
of the most well-known rights that American citizens enjoy, such as the right to due
process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the freedom of speech and religion,
or the right to vote. These examples fall under the headings of civil and political rights,
and they generally make up the popular conception of rights. However, there’s another
category of things that are sometimes discussed in connection with rights: a right to
healthcare, right to a job, right to an education, right to housing, and many others. These
are so-called economic rights: positive state guarantees of material protections. Unlike
civil and political rights, which generally involve protections against the government,
rights of political participation, and personal liberties, economic rights are promises of
specific economic benefits for citizens in a political community. To understand the
relevance of economic rights, it’s first worthwhile to describe economic rights in greater
detail and take a look at their history in the American tradition.
To illuminate the specific nature of economic rights, it will be useful to compare
them with more familiar civil and political claims. Brian Orend uses helpful terminology
to distinguish the two groups, calling civil and political rights “first-generation rights,”
and he includes in that group claims about security of the person, property, due process
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and typical political rights like freedom of speech or religion.22 He calls economic rights
“second-generation rights,” and he includes more specific claims to a basic level of
material subsistence along with social and economic freedoms.23 The easiest distinction
between the two is that first-generation rights are generally negative freedoms,
protections against abuse by state power, whereas second-generation rights tend to be
positive freedoms, which require action by the government to enact the promised right.
For opponents of economic rights, this distinction is of paramount importance. Positive
rights oblige action by another party, and in doing so they necessarily impose a duty upon
another free person. Defenders of personal liberties think that positive rights undermine
the entire liberal (need a different word such as ideology) by submitting individuals to the
tyranny of those who can invoke positive rights-based claims against them. In practical
terms, the liberty infringing mechanism would be increased taxation to fund government
action to promote the positive rights. In the American constitutional tradition, firstgeneration rights take center stage, and positive rights aren’t much of a factor. The
original Bill of Rights includes a bevy of negative rights that preclude action by the
federal government, but it doesn’t include any positive declarations about how the
government should use its remaining power. The difference between the generations of
rights may have a simple explanation, the thinkers of the Enlightenment, who heavily
influenced the founders, were theorizing in an era where the primary concern was

Brian Orend, “Justifying Socioeconomic Rights,” in Economic Rights in Canada and the United States,
ed. Rhonda E. Howard-Hassmann and Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2006), 25.
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government tyranny.24 The lack of positive rights in the American tradition is probably a
primary reason why economic rights have historically not been widely recognized by the
American people.
In the modern era, economic rights are also closely connected to the concept of
human rights, which Orend defines as “a high-priority claim to a set of objects that are
owed to each human person as a matter of minimally decent treatment”25. Joseph Wronka
offers an even briefer summation of human rights, “human rights are statements of
human needs”26. The most widely accepted collection of human rights is found in the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948.27 This
document consists of 30 articles which declare a number of civil, political, and economic
rights. The 30 articles are a mixture of first and second generation rights, and there isn’t
an explicit delineation between the two in the document itself. Eleanor Roosevelt chaired
the UN Commission on Human Rights which drafted the declaration, and the resulting
document is clearly influenced by the economic rights that Roosevelt discussed in his
“Four Freedoms” speech and his 1944 State of the Union.28 Human rights aren’t often
discussed in the American tradition because of the aforementioned historical focus on the
civil and political liberties in our Constitution. America only seriously considered the
idea of economic rights for a brief period in the early 1940s, when Franklin Roosevelt
was promoting those ideas as a necessary precondition of lasting international peace that

24
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he hoped to engineer in the aftermath of World War II. Cass Sunstein notes the stark
contrast between America and the rest of the world on the topic of human rights, “the
Universal Declaration reflects an international agreement about the rights that people
have. And it provides a dramatic contrast to the American Constitution”29. Wronka
published a comparative textual analysis of the United States Constitution and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and concluded that there was no overlap between
the two in the sphere of economics, “Apart from extremely weak phraseology of the
general welfare and establish justice clauses of the Federal Constitution, there appear no
correspondences with positive rights as described in Articles 22 through 27”30. In contrast
with an international consensus that sees civil and political rights as interdependent with
economic rights, the American Constitution stands on its own in its sole recognition of
civil and political liberties.31 As has been noted, this break can be traced to the historical
moment when the U.S. Constitution was drafted, but that history wouldn’t prevent
America from joining growing international consensus in favor of positive economic
rights.
The American constitutional order has, in fact, come close to recognizing positive
economic claims as constitutional rights in the past. Over the history of the United States,
the Constitution has been interpreted to include rights that go far beyond what was
explicitly intended by the founding fathers. In Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice William
Douglas famously interpreted the Constitution as including a right to privacy, which he

Cass Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More Than
Ever (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 101.
30
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found in the so-called penumbra of the first amendment. Douglas described penumbras as
being “formed by emanations from those guarantees [the Bill of Rights] that help give
them life and substance”32. By way of such decisions, the opinions of the Supreme Court
effectively become the real constitutional text of the United States. In the 1960s, the
Warren Court came close to recognizing a few guarantees of minimum welfare as
constitutionally protected rights.33 Decisions like Gideon v. Wainright and Goldberg v.
Kelly went down the path of giving specific rights to poor people. In Gideon it was a right
to defense counsel for the indigent, and in Goldberg it was a right to due process before
being deprived of welfare. However, with the retirement of Chief Justice Warren and the
election of Richard Nixon, the composition of the Supreme Court changed, and the new
majority emphatically shut down the idea that the Constitution protected specific
economic rights. (perhaps elaborate on the conservative judicial appointments Nixon
made to illustrate how he moved the court to the right) In San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, the Court had the opportunity to hold that education was a
fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution. They declined to do so, and the
Supreme Court hasn’t seriously taken up the idea of economic rights since then.34
Notably, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissent in Rodriguez included a discussion of how
the Court could have decided to protect economic rights. Marshall draws on the logic of
the penumbra to argue that, “The task in every case should be to determine the extent to
which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not mentioned in the
Constitution. As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the
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nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more
fundamental”35. In Rodriguez, the case was addressing education, and Marshall argued
that the nexus between education and other guaranteed rights was close enough that
education was itself a fundamentally guaranteed right. Though the Court didn’t side with
Marshall, his dissent remains an interesting explanation of how the American
Constitution could protect economic rights.
A reasonable critic of the American approach to rights may ask why the founding
fathers couldn’t just include declarations of economic rights as an addition to their
extensive work in the area of political rights. It was previously noted that one of the
driving forces behind the focus on political rights was the danger of political tyranny in
the late 18th century. The Revolutionary War was fought against a tyrannical king, and
the new government was created to prevent the excesses of monarchical rule. However,
this doesn’t seem like sufficient explanation to maintain relative silence on the topic of
economic rights. Ganesh Sitaraman takes up this question in his book, The Crisis of the
Middle-Class Constitution.” Sitaraman proposes that they ignored the question of
economic inequality because they thought the structure of the American economy
precluded dramatic wealth disparities that constitutional guarantees would need to
alleviate.36 Writing about Madison’s discussion of the multiplicity of interests
constraining factions in Federalist No. 10, he discusses why Madison omits class,
perhaps the most significant faction of all, “The unstated assumption that made
Madison’s ‘variety of interests’ theory work was the relative economic equality that
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characterized the American republic”.37 On this view, the founders’ silence on specific
economic rights shouldn’t be seen as a condemnation of the whole idea. Rather, the
omission reflects an assumption about the underlying class structure in America. Namely,
that assumption was that America would remain a mostly agrarian economy with a
correspondingly flat distribution of wealth. In contemporary terms, this economic
composition would be described as a broad middle class. William Forbath and Joseph
Fishkin make a similar claim to Sitaraman that, “the core of these reformers’ arguments
was an idea that we cannot keep our constitutional democracy—our “republican form of
government”—without certain essentials: constitutional restraints against oligarchy and a
political economy that sustains a robust, wide-open middle class, broad enough to
accommodate everyone”38. As the character of the American economy has shifted, the
assumption that we will have a self-sustaining broad middle class hasn’t held up. At the
time of the founding, economic rights would have been redundant since they would have
been guaranteeing a level of economic wellbeing that people could reach without the
assistance of the government. However, now that the agrarian economy of the
Revolutionary time has given way to modern industrial capitalism, economic rights could
be a way of reasserting the prominence of a healthy middle class that the founders
thought to be a necessary precondition for our Constitution.
Economic rights also are often conflated with large-scale government welfare
programs that have been designed to implement them. This conflation is a
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misunderstanding of the nature of an economic right. A right to minimal subsistence need
not entail any specific provision mechanism. Orend makes the point that providing for
those who can’t provide for themselves is different from large-scale socialism, “it’s
wrong to confuse the assertion that people have rights to food, clothing, shelter,
education, clean water, and medical care with the view that the government must set up a
huge, separate program for each to actually provide these things for everyone”39.
Opponents of economic rights conjure up images of bureaucratic boogeymen who are
trying to undermine the fundamental right of private property. However, economic rights
don’t have to be a danger to private interests and personal liberty. In fact, some of the
most fervent defenders of personal freedoms have defended basic economic rights.
Chapter One of Milton Friedman’s classic work, Capitalism and Freedom, is called “The
Relation between Economic Freedom and Political Freedom,” and he devotes that chapter
to the idea that “economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the
achievement of political freedom,” which may as well be another way of phrasing
Franklin Roosevelt’s classic claim that “necessitous men are not free men” 40. In the same
book, Friedman recognizes the ills of poverty and advocates for a negative income tax to
ensure a minimum level of economic stability for the poorest in society41. In their work
trying to rehabilitate a left leaning understanding of Constitutional economic rights,
Fishkin and Forbath note that it’s the libertarian right who have put forth the most
consistent vision of constitutionalized economic rights, “For an affirmative argument
about the demands the Constitution makes on political economy and the opportunity
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structure, today the best place to look is the libertarian right. Libertarian advocates have a
substantive vision of a political and economic order that they believe the Constitution
requires. They have long translated that vision into rights claims that can be enforced in
court”42. Though the economic rights they may envision differ in extent when compared
to those proposed by Roosevelt and others, it’s noteworthy that there is support for
economic rights across the political spectrum. One doesn’t have to be a card-carrying
member of the communist party to believe that economic rights are important,43 nor is it
necessary to be a devoted classical liberal, but it does seem relevant that there is support
for the broad concept of economic rights at both extremes of the ideological spectrum.
Franklin Roosevelt’s call for a “Second Bill of Rights” in his 1944 State of the
Union Address was the most high-profile instance of an American politician advocating
for substantive economic rights. He saw them as a natural augmentation of the existing
American Constitutional Order, and the next chapter will explore, in detail, the
development of his ideas about economic rights in the American context.
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Chapter Two: FDR
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidential administration lasted 12 years, and in
that time, he brought America through both the worst economic collapse in its history and
helped win the largest war the world had ever seen. But perhaps the most lasting mark he
left on society was the massive reordering of the American economic order that he
undertook during his time in office. His New Deal programs changed how Americans
viewed the powers of the national government and promoted large-scale government
action to solve the great economic crisis of the day. By the time he died in 1945, he had
accomplished an economic shift of unparalleled consequence. One of his biographers,
H.W. Brands, described this shift in dramatic terms, “Franklin Roosevelt radically altered
the landscape of American expectations. The small-government world of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was banished forever. Americans demanded more of their
government: more services, more safeguards, more security” 44. Indeed, it was that idea of
safeguards and security that animated much of Roosevelt’s life work. In his first two
terms he framed this message as a choice between democracy and economic royalism.45
It was a fight against the tyranny of oligarchy, and he won it by securing a measure of
prosperity for all citizens. In the last half of his presidency, the terms of the conversation
shifted to focus on the emerging threat of fascism and dictatorships.46 In those terms his
focus on security was even more apparent, though this time it was a physical security
from the predations of fascist states. However, Roosevelt coupled this intense focus on
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security with an equally strong commitment to freedom. He believed that intimate
connections between security of all sorts and crucial freedoms were necessary to maintain
the democratic order. The practical manifestation of this commitment eventually came
from his articulation of a “Second Bill of Rights” in his 1944 State of the Union Address.
The Second Bill was a statement of a series of economic rights that were the means by
which Roosevelt proposed to guarantee the freedoms to which he was so committed. The
economic rights provided a minimum level of economic security which Roosevelt
thought was necessary to ensure all other freedoms. To provide context for the genesis of
the Second Bill of Rights, it’s worthwhile to trace the development of Roosevelt’s
commitment to freedom and security.
Cass Sunstein authored the definitive book on Roosevelt’s efforts in the economic
rights sphere, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need
It More Than Ever, and he points to a few key moments in the evolution of Roosevelt’s
ideas. Those moments include a 1932 campaign speech at the Commonwealth Club in
San Francisco, discussions of economic rights in his 1936 address at the Democratic
National Convention, the 1941 State of the Union and his famous articulation of four
freedoms, the internationalization of those freedoms in the Atlantic Charter in mid-1941,
and the culmination in his 1944 State of the Union where he lays out a second bill of
rights.47 A more detailed examination of these texts will show how and why Roosevelt
was so committed to the idea of economic rights.

Cass Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’s Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More Than
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Roosevelt’s Commonwealth Club Address was delivered to an audience of more
than 2000 businesspeople at a lunch reception in San Francisco, and press articles on the
speech indicate that the response was tepid at best.48 The speech was primarily composed
by a Columbia Law Professor, Alfred Berle, who was a member of Roosevelt’s so-called
“Brain Trust.”49 The speech was essentially a distillation of Berle’s academic work,
which focused on the changing character of the American economy over the course of the
19th and 20th centuries. Berle’s take was inherently more pessimistic than the ever
optimistic Roosevelt, and the speech delved into rather arcane matters of theory that were
at least partially at odds with Roosevelt’s famous aversion to political philosophizing.
The tepid reception was probably a result of the borderline socialist content of the speech,
which would have been distasteful to a gathering of businessmen, and also because of its
rather lengthy historical digressions, which read more like an academic lecture than the
soaring oratory Roosevelt is known for. Despite the lack of import in the moment, the
Commonwealth Club Speech stands out as a first articulation of the kinds of themes
Roosevelt will return to later in his presidency. D.W. Houck undertakes a lengthy
rhetorical analysis of the Commonwealth Club Speech, and then dismisses it because he
sees Berle’s hand rather than Roosevelt’s.50 However, the important bits aren’t the ones
that are easily identifiable as Berle’s academic work, those are the lengthy discussions of
the economic development of the nation and his pessimistic take on the allocation of
resources. Houck calls Berle’s points, “A view of economic stagnation and retrenchment”
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that Roosevelt “had never articulated”51. Rather than those pieces, the important parts are
ones that speak to the larger themes that Roosevelt will continue to voice in the future.
Sunstein sees the speech in this light, and he takes it as indicative of a blend between
Berle’s academic thought and Roosevelt’s optimism plus one specifically novel
engagement, “[The Commonwealth Club Speech] showed a direct engagement with
unemployment and its human meaning—an engagement that led to a novel emphasis on
the centrality of security”52. It’s for those portions that the Commonwealth Club Speech
needs to be looked at.
Towards the final part of the speech, Roosevelt utters the words that will continue
to define his political agenda, “As I see it, the task of Government in its relation to
business is to assist the development of an economic declaration of rights, an economic
constitutional order. This is the common task of statesman and business man. It is the
minimum requirement of a more permanently safe order of things”53. There’s a lot to
unpack in just this short paragraph, but it’s all emblematic of the path Roosevelt will
tread in the future. First of all, he begins this passage by noting that the task of
Government in the realm of economics is fundamentally related to the conduct of
business. So the development of this declaration of rights is a joint venture between the
Government and private industry. Roosevelt was no socialist. Sunstein notes that he was,
indeed, strongly committed to the capitalist system, “He was committed to free markets,
free enterprise, and private ownership of property. He was not an egalitarian. . . It was
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freedom, not equality, that motivated the second bill of rights”54. In the Commonwealth
Club Speech, his commitments are to the ends of economic security, the mechanism by
which that is achieved is left open to interpretation. That ambivalence about the means by
which his agenda was implemented is a well documented part of Roosevelt’s character;
Sunstein describes him as such, “Roosevelt was an experimenter, a pragmatist interested
in results and solutions rather than theories and themes”55. His lack of interest in a formal
theory behind his agenda could explain his affinity for economic rights. In the passage he
next refers to an “economic constitutional order,” which is a perfect way to describe his
theory-less economic agenda. By ascribing certain economic principles the status of
constitutional rights, he placed them as central goals that the nation should strive for,
through whichever means they want. The final portion of this passage connects economic
rights to the notion of security. This will be a major theme that Roosevelt returns to in
later years, particularly during the War period. By putting economic rights together with
their most tangible benefit, physical security, Roosevelt lends an urgency to the creation
and maintenance of these economic goals. Through the language of security, Roosevelt
harnesses the anxiety of a people faced with external threats. Though at the time of this
speech Roosevelt does not have the foil of international fascism, he will circle back
around to his early thoughts on security when faced with advancing an economic agenda
while fighting a war.
The Commonwealth Club Speech is also notable for articulating two specific
economic rights that Roosevelt would later expand and elaborate on, the right to life and
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the right to property. Introducing the first right, he said, “Every man has a right to life;
and this means that he has also a right to make a comfortable living. . . Our Government
formal and informal, political and economic, owes to everyone an avenue to possess
himself of a portion of plenty sufficient for his needs, through his own work”56. This right
to life plays off the old motif from the preamble Declaration of Independence, that all
men have rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In this case, that familiar
right to life is taken by Roosevelt and filled out with a robust meaning related to
employment. The right to life here means more than just a right to existence; Roosevelt,
instead, defines it as a right to make a comfortable living. Also of note is a continuing
theme of having private industry asa joint partner, and even a leader, in upholding the
rights Roosevelt discusses. Roosevelt is agnostic about the means by which his ends are
accomplished, and if he could harness the energy of private industry to meet his ends he
would. The other specific right he sketches in this speech is a right to property, and
specifically a safety of savings, “Every man has a right to his own property; which means
a right to be assured, to the fullest extent attainable, in the safety of his savings. By no
other means can men carry the burdens of those parts of life which, in the nature of
things, afford no chance of labor; childhood, sickness, old age”57. This right was
particularly relevant in 1932, after the Great Depression sparked bank runs which
devasted the savings of ordinary families. This right in particular seems to be a
forerunner of a more complete notion of material security. The goal of savings safety is to
allow families to feel secure in their material condition, and it would be a logical next

56
57

Roosevelt, “Commonwealth Club Speech.”
Ibid.

24

step to more thoroughly assure a minimum material condition later on. As to these
specific rights, Sunstein notes that they can be seen as clear precursors to the programs he
creates to promote employment and secure savings during the New Deal58. The great
legacy of the Commonwealth Club Speech is its evidence that even in the early stage of
Roosevelt’s presidential career he was discussing the theme that economic rights ensured
security, a notion that would animate his economic agenda for the next 13 years.
Four years later, at the 1936 Democratic National Convention, Roosevelt further
articulated his vision of a government committed to economic rights. In Philadelphia, the
home of Independence Hall, Roosevelt began his ambitious convention address by
directly harkening back to the days of the American Revolution, “Philadelphia is a good
city in which to write American history. This is fitting ground on which to reaffirm the
faith of our fathers; to pledge ourselves to restore to the people a wider freedom; to give
to 1936 as the founders gave to 1776—an American way of life”59. Here he makes
explicit the connection between his project and the Declaration of Independence, which
was only an allusion four years before in San Francisco. In this statement he is making a
sweeping claim to the same revolutionary authority that the founders had when fighting
against the British. However, instead of struggling against political tyranny, Roosevelt
identifies his opposition as a new form of ‘economic royalists,’ “The royalists of the
economic order have conceded that political freedom was the business of the
Government, but they have maintained that economic slavery was nobody's business.
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They granted that the Government could protect the citizen in his right to vote, but they
denied that the Government could do anything to protect the citizen in his right to work
and his right to live”60. He equates the forces of economic oppression with the British
Royalists, enemies of political freedom that all Americans are bound to oppose. These
new royalists allow the government to protect political liberties, but their economic
domination of the common man infringes on their ability to exercise those liberties.
Roosevelt also returns to the concepts of right to live and right to work. In this speech,
these economic rights are bulwarks against the domination of the new royalists. Those
rights, among others, secure conditions of economic security and free the people from
economic domination. Roosevelt goes on to warn that these business interests will
denounce him as the real agent of oppression, “These economic royalists complain that
we seek to overthrow the institutions of America. . . (do you mean to have three dots
here, or just one period?) In their blindness they forget what the Flag and the
Constitution stand for. Now, as always, they stand for democracy, not tyranny; for
freedom, not subjection; and against a dictatorship by mob rule and the over-privileged
alike”61. Ganesh Sitaraman notes the overtly constitutional nature of the whole speech,
and particularly this portion, “Roosevelt’s speech put the economic challenge of the time
in distinctly constitutional terms. At stake was the survival of the American system of
government, the preservation of democracy.” He also goes on to link this address to the
Commonwealth Club Speech and its reference to an “economic constitutional order” 62.
Sitaraman’s point is important because it shows how fundamental Roosevelt’s argument
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is. Rather than just bullet pointing a list of economic programs, he publicizes the
underlying rationale for his systemic upheaval of the existing economic order, and
Roosevelt’s urgent tone makes it clear that the conflict with the royalists is one of
existential importance to American democracy.
After introducing the problem of the economic royalists in depth, he first utters
the most succinct summation of the problem with this new form of tyranny, “An old
English judge once said: "Necessitous men are not free men." Liberty requires
opportunity to make a living—a living decent according to the standard of the time, a
living which gives man not only enough to live by, but something to live for”63. Quoting
from the ever-prescient judges of the common law, Roosevelt brought his trademark
eloquence to bear on the otherwise complex relationship between economic rights and
security. All of the hundred thousand or more people in the crowd could understand the
point Roosevelt was making, their vaunted political liberties were only as secure as their
material conditions allowed them to be. True freedom, in the American sense of the
word, required action to provide a healthy minimum of material condition. Roosevelt
made that commitment concrete in the 1936 Democratic platform, whose opening lines
called for economic guarantees that were spiritually descended from the Declaration of
Independence, “We hold this truth to be self-evident—that government in a modern
civilization has certain inescapable obligations to its citizens, among which are: (1)
Protection of the family and the home. (2) Establishment of a democracy of opportunity
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for all the people. (3) Aid to those overtaken by disaster”64. These goals are more specific
targets that Roosevelt hoped would combat necessitousness. Although these goals could
all be easily connected to specific rights, Sunstein makes an important note that
Roosevelt hasn’t yet taken the step of explicitly articulating his goals in terms of rights,
“This catalog of objectives was not cast in terms of rights. But with a little effort, it could
easily be translated into those terms.” He goes on to say, “It took an external threat to
push Roosevelt to take that step”65. The outbreak of World War II, and the shift in the
landscape of domestic political affairs that accompanied it changed Roosevelt’s approach
to his economic agenda.
By 1941, the growing threat of fascism and communism around the globe had
limited the appeal of Roosevelt’s old anti-royalist rhetoric. To continue to promote his
agenda, Roosevelt and his administration had to change their messaging. Sitaraman
describes this change, “In 1936, Roosevelt framed America’s choice as between
democracy and economic royalism, his version of the old debate between republics and
oligarchy. . . (three dots?) But by the 1940s, the threat of oligarchy and demagogues
preying on the poor had largely dropped out of the conversation, replaced by a fear of
dictatorship”66. Despite the external enemy changing from Mr. Monopoly to Mr.
Mussolini, the basic message remained the same. Freedom, liberty, were the goals of our
government, and true freedom could only be ensured once the physical and material
security of the people was guaranteed.
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Roosevelt’s 1941 State of the Union Address, more commonly known as the Four
Freedoms Speech, is the most famous example of Roosevelt’s new approach to his
economic agenda. In that speech he called on the country to take note of the worsening
conditions around the globe, exhorting them to see how “every realist knows that the
democratic way of life is at this moment being directly assailed in every part of the
world”67. This dire warning was preceded by a long list of conflicts that the United States
did not deem necessary to involve itself in. By cataloguing the isolationist history of the
prior century, Roosevelt hoped to draw a contrast with the dire circumstances of 1941. He
twisted the usual upbeat line of presidents before and after him, “the state of our union is
strong,” to say “As your President, performing my constitutional duty to ‘give to the
Congress information of the state of the Union,” I find it, unhappily, necessary to report
that the future and the safety of our country and of our democracy are overwhelmingly
involved in events far beyond our borders”68. Americans had always been wary of
entanglement in a European war, and Roosevelt had to convince them that it was in their
self-interest to care about the outcome of the far-flung conflict. The bulk of his speech
was devoted to an explanation of his rationale for providing material support to the
victims of aggression abroad. For the average American, the takeaway was that by
propping up democracies around the world, the enemies of freedom will not be able to
bring war to American shores. However, ever the optimist, Roosevelt didn’t want to cast
his international ambitions in purely calculating and geostrategic terms. He exhorted the
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people to remember the convictions that he wanted America to stand for, “Those who
man our defenses, and those behind them who build our defenses, must have the stamina
and the courage which come from unshakable belief in the manner of life which they are
defending. The mighty action that we are calling for cannot be based on a disregard of all
things worth fighting for” and he continued, “Certainly this is no time for any of us to
stop thinking about the social and economic problems which are the root cause of the
social revolution which is today a supreme factor in the world”69. The coming war would
not be one that was fought simply out of necessity, America was on the righteous side,
supporting the cause of liberty. Even, or perhaps especially, in the face of a looming
fascist threat, Roosevelt remained committed to the ambitious reordering of the American
economic order that had been his project for the previous two terms.
The Four Freedoms Speech moved on to a restatement of the economic ideals that
Roosevelt thought were necessary to maintain a democratic order. He reminded the
people what they were in simple terms, “there is nothing mysterious about the
foundations of a healthy and strong democracy. The basic things expected by our people
of their political and economic systems are simple. They are: Equality of opportunity for
youth and for others; jobs for those who can work; security for those who need it; the
ending of special privilege for the few; the preservation of civil liberties for all; the
enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and constantly rising standard of
living”70. Roosevelt’s political thought always began with the ends he sought, and these
simple goals were in line with the commitments he was making as early as the
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Commonwealth Club Speech. As objectives for his policymaking, they easily match up
with the economic constitutional order that he was trying to promote, and he did promote
specific policies, from the extension of unemployment insurance to increased access to
healthcare, to meet these goals. The more detailed proposals were a departure from
Roosevelt’s usual tendency to set out his goals but not necessarily articulate the means to
achieve them. Sunstein, however, lauds this attempt to, as he says, “amid the threat of
war, propose a bold new series of domestic reforms.”71 But the real heart of the speech is
in its spirited conclusion.
For the finale, Roosevelt finally launches into the eponymous four freedoms,
saying that, “We look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms.”
“The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world.
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—
everywhere in the world.
The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means
economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime
life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world.
The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a
world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough
fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical
aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.”72
These four freedoms are the most concrete expression of Roosevelt’s animating purpose
he offered in all his time in office. Taken together, they constitute a complete articulation
of the modern democratic ideal. The first and second freedoms are well known to
Americans who are from an early age raised with the core protections of the Bill of
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Rights etched into their memory. Freedom of expression and worship are the prototypical
negative liberties that citizens in a democratic society expect. They represent the sorts of
freedoms that are typically associated with the American constitutional order. It’s the
third and fourth freedoms where Roosevelt moves into new territory. Freedom from want
represents the minimum material conditions that all of Roosevelt’s economic policies
work towards. Moving forward, freedom from want will be the animating concern of
Roosevelt’s sponsorship of economic rights. Freedom from fear is both an old and new
idea for Roosevelt. On the one hand, it calls back to the immortal line in his first
inaugural address that “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” but on the other hand
it is a new sentiment which leans heavily on the physical security that the United States
will go to war over a few short months after this speech is delivered (the 2nd half of this
sentence needs to be more direct but I can’t figure out how to fix it). Freedom from fear
is about guaranteeing his people the fundamental security from outside aggression. The
final two freedoms also directly connect with one another. Physical security from
external powers is worthless unless it is accompanied by a freedom from economic
domination (domination by whom? Explain a bit). Roosevelt plainly understood this fact,
so he always tried to frame his economic proposals as guarantees of security. The four
freedoms remained a potent force that represented the values America would fight for in
World War II and beyond.
The four freedoms were also notable for their international character. Roosevelt
dictated them personally, and he insisted on including the tag of “everywhere in the
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world” after each freedom.73 Roosevelt backed up his internationalist tendencies when he
met Winston Churchill eight months later at a clandestine meeting off the coast of
Newfoundland. The public result of that meeting was a joint communique that has come
to be known as the Atlantic Charter. The short document is a list of eight principles on
which the two leaders “base their hopes for a better future for the world”74. The Charter’s
most relevant principles are the fifth and sixth, “Fifth, they desire to bring about the
fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing,
for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security; Sixth, after
the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will
afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and
which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in
freedom from fear and want”75. Both clearly show the influence of the four freedoms
speech. The fifth lays out concrete objectives for securing the material conditions of all
peoples, and the sixth directly references freedom from fear and want. The Atlantic
Charter was well received around the free world because of its serious commitments to
liberal values, but in America the reaction was muted76. Roosevelt internationalized his
values, even though it was not a popular move at home, because he believed that the
rights of economic and political security were universal. It was this international theme
that his wife Eleanor would carry forward in her push to enshrine Roosevelt’s economic
values in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
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Finally, in Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union, he articulated his full vision of a
Second Bill of Rights which was centered on guarantees of economic security and
implemented through a series of economic rights. He specified eight particular economic
rights that would constitute the Second Bill,
“The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or
mines of the Nation;
The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation;
The right of every farmer to raise and sell his products at a return which will give
him and his family a decent living;
The right of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an atmosphere of
freedom from unfair competition and domination by monopolies at home or
abroad;
The right of every family to a decent home;
The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good
health;
The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness,
accident, and unemployment;
The right to a good education.”77
As a group, they touch on many common economic afflictions that all citizens would be
familiar with. Roosevelt summarized this list in a familiar manner, following his
presentation of the bill with the assertion that “all these rights spell security”78. After
reviewing the evolution of his statements on economics and freedom, this focus on
security should come as no surprise. All the way back in the Commonwealth Club
Speech, Roosevelt was stating his intention to create an “economic constitutional order”
which “is the minimum requirement of a more permanently safe order of things”79.
Though he may not have fully fleshed it out then, the bones of what would become the
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Second Bill are plainly apparent. Economics, specified at the formative constitutional
level, was necessary to ensure the safety of all people. The beauty of Roosevelt’s
approach is that unlike the grand security pronouncements of the totalitarian leaders of
his day, this security enhanced freedom rather than restricted it. Roosevelt sought to
create conditions of economic and physical security because he felt it enhanced freedom,
which he saw as the ultimate goal of all democratic governments.
It undoubtedly wasn’t lost on Roosevelt, being the astute politician that he was,
that arguments in favor of a robust notion of security would be well received by the
wartime public. Indeed, Sunstein argues that the Second Bill was an attempt by Roosevelt
to reconcile the two distinct phases of his presidency, “The call for the second bill was an
attempt to connect these two doctors [Dr. New Deal and Dr. Win the War]—to suggest
that they shared the single task of ensuring security” 80. This is a convincing claim about
the political rationale for the Second Bill, and this speech certainly came at an opportune
moment, but Roosevelt’s history of connecting the two ideas of economic rights and
security suggests that the Second Bill was more than just a political ploy to advance his
domestic agenda. Ganesh Sitaraman suggests that the Second Bill was also a way of
reconciling Roosevelt’s early attempts at changing the structure of economic institutions
with his more pro-business side that came out during the war years, “World War II
shifted Roosevelt from a debate over the structure of economic institutions to the creation
of an economic bill of rights”81. A rights-based approach was means agnostic, always
appealing to the pragmatic Roosevelt, and crucially the ambiguity surrounding
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implementation meant it could win the support of interests across the political spectrum.
While conservative organizations could (and did) oppose his early New Deal efforts,
broad claims about health care and education could receive support from all corners. In
this way, the Second Bill was meant less as a policy statement than as a set of aspirations
for policymakers to aim for in the future. By intimately connecting the Second Bill to
victory in the war, also Roosevelt seemed to be trying to set the terms on which the
country would discuss its peacetime domestic agenda, indeed he said as much “It is our
duty now to begin to lay the plans and determine the strategy for the winning of a lasting
peace and the establishment of an American standard of living higher than ever before
known”82. Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s untimely death hampered his ability to affect the
national conversation, and the only immediate legislative response to the Second Bill was
the passage of the GI bill of rights83. While that package of benefits for returning soldiers
was certainly a strong start to an implementation of the Second Bill, it fell short of
Roosevelt’s expectations for action that would benefit the whole of society.
The entire Second Bill is devoted to Roosevelt’s twin goals of freedom and
security. However, the popular conception of those two concepts would indicate that they
are more likely to conflict with than mutually reinforce one another. Indeed, security,
understood as government action, is often thought to hamper liberty, not promote it.
Sunstein calls this popular conception “the myth of laissez-faire,” which he boiled down
to the simple premise that “nobody really opposes government intervention”84. On its

Roosevelt, “Second Bill of Rights Speech.”
Sunstein, Second Bill of Rights, 15.
84
Ibid., 19,
82
83

36

face, this appears to be an astoundingly controversial claim, but Sunstein justifies it by
noting the ways in which government action secures all the conditions by which
supposedly “free” exchange occurs.85 While Sunstein attacked this “myth” on more
academic terms, Roosevelt challenged this paradigm in his classic straightforward
manner. He would ridicule the idea that there could be strict separation between the
economic sphere and government action. In his first nomination acceptance speech in
1932, he railed against Republican political leaders taking that very stance, “while they
prate of economic laws, men and women are starving. We must lay hold of the fact that
economic laws are not made by nature. They are made by human beings”86. By claiming
economic laws as human creation, he asserted the right to challenge and reform them.
The Second Bill is the concrete outcome of his foray into economic laws. In the Second
Bill, he elevates his conventional economic welfare policies to the vaunted tier of laws
and rights, and in doing so he changes the terms of the argument around them. The
questions surrounding a Second Bill of Rights are ones about the core ideals that those
proposed rights represent, rather than the nuts and bolts of specific policies. By placing
his goals into this lofty space, he was trying to set the terms of any debate that would
occur about them. If he could win acceptance of his basic aspirations, the only remaining
questions would be around implementation.
We’ve traced the development of Roosevelt’s ideas about freedom and security,
and we saw how they finally manifested themselves in his Second Bill of Rights.
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However, with Roosevelt’s subsequent death and the fracturing of the New Deal
coalition, implementation of his economic rights sputtered out. The next chapter will
draw on Roosevelt’s own ideas and some international comparisons to examine the two
main ways economic rights could be implemented.

38

Chapter Three: Two Approaches to Implementation
The preceding chapters have engaged at length with the rationale behind
economic rights and their place in the American system. However, there’s been little
discussion about what economic rights would look like in practice. For many skeptics
about the utility of the sort of approach outlined by FDR in the Second Bill of Rights
Speech, questions about implementation are a big part of their concerns. To allay those
concerns, it’s worthwhile to examine the mechanisms by which economic rights could be
put into practice. To that end, there seems to be two distinct paths by which economic
rights could be placed into action. K. Sabeel Rahman makes the distinction between
“small-c” and “big-C” constitutionalism, where “small-c” is “This is the
constitutionalism of social movements, of public philosophy, and of the laws and
regulations that literally constitute our politics and our economics” and “big-C” is the
“Constitutionalism of Supreme Court doctrine, precedent, or textual interpretation” 87.
That difference is helpful for describing the two approaches to economic rights. The “bigC” version of economic rights is perhaps the more obvious path. On this view, the rights
could be secured by enshrining them in constitutional text. This approach is common in
many of the world’s Constitutions which were written after the beginning of the modern
human rights era and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.88 However, Roosevelt
was not an advocate of the “big-C” approach for his Second Bill, he wanted the catalog
of rights to serve as an aspiration which Congress would look to implement. Immediately
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following his outline of the Second Bill he said, “I ask the Congress to explore the means
for implementing this economic bill of rights- for it is definitely the responsibility of the
Congress so to do”89. Cass Sunstein describes this approach as an attempt to change the
nation’s constitutive commitments without changing specific constitutional text.90
Sunstein describes constitutive commitments as “a statement of the fundamental
aspirations of the United States,” and he offers the Declaration of Independence as the
most significant and well-known example of such commitments.91 Although Roosevelt
was a proponent of the “small-c” approach, either method would work to implement
economic rights, and both have advantages and drawbacks that need to be fleshed out.
The “big-C” constitutional approach is more popular in the international context,
and its direct manner has significant appeal. Joseph Wronka fleshes out this appeal in
general terms, “Because of the legal status of constitutions, people could then refer to
them as legitimate claims in order to have their basic human needs met. Judiciary,
legislative, and executive branches of government and law enforcement personnel would
also refer to them as standards for the development and implementation of just social
policies”92. By using the concrete method of adjusting constitutional text to implement
economic rights, those rights immediately gain a stature and sense of permanence that
they wouldn’t otherwise have. As Wronka points out, they are also functionally binding
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on all arms of the government, and both state actors and citizens would be used to
abiding by constitutional directives. Perhaps most importantly, by placing rights in a
constitution they become legally enforceable claims that a country’s judiciary is bound to
protect. That legal protection is at the root of many concerns about constitutionally
implemented economic rights.
The legal enforceability of economic rights claims brings up the so-called
problem of judicial enforcement. The problem has two facets. The first is the question of
ambiguity in economic rights. More so even than political rights, economic rights seem to
bear on questions of specific policies, and by making the rights judicially enforceable,
judges are put in the position of ruling on the efficacy of programs which they may not
have the expertise to analyze.93 Since the specific rights they are ruling from, for instance
a “right to health care,” are quite vague, judges don’t have the tools to determine what the
specific content of that right would entail.94 Sunstein disputes the legitimacy of this
portion of the judicial enforceability problem by comparing determinations about
economic rights to the task judges undertake when interpreting political rights, “Does
free speech encompass commercial advertising, libel, sexually explicit speech, bribery,
criminal solicitation, and nude dancing? Courts try to answer this question
notwithstanding the vagueness of the text, and in doing so, they typically concede that the
right itself is far from self-defining”95. Judges are always filling in the specific content of
ambiguous rights, the only difference with an economic right is the character of that
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content. The distinction in character brings up the second part of the problem of judicial
enforcement. Governments exist in a world of limited resources, and since economic
rights are guarantees of material benefits, judges would be in the position of designing
programs and making decisions about allocations of funds. Courts seem to be manifestly
unfit for the task of determining the distribution of government funds, and in America,
and Stephen Holmes and Sunstein compellingly make this argument, “While judges may
be perfectly competent to spot egregious violations of rights and even to invalidate
egregious misallocations of resources, they cannot intelligently decide, in most such
cases, when imaginable remedies are better channeled to other pressing needs”96. Holmes
and Sunstein don’t invalidate the entire idea of economic rights as a result, but they do
note that scarcity is an unavoidable problem, and the courts seem to be particularly illsuited to wrestling with that problem, particularly relative to the legislature.97 However,
these objections haven’t stopped many countries around the world from placing
economic guarantees into their constitutions, and the ways they have dealt with the
problem of judicial enforcement are instructive.
In the post-World War II era, many of the new constitutions that were drafted
incorporated economic rights, and they sourced those rights to the previously discussed
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Sunstein describes this ubiquity of the
Universal Declaration, “All over the globe, modern constitutions follow the Universal
Declaration in creating social and economic rights, sometimes using its precise words”98.

96

Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 2000), 95.
97
Ibid., 131.
98
Sunstein, Second Bill of Rights, 102.

42

Most European states include economic rights in their constitutions, and the
European Union acts to enforce those obligations on its member states via the European
Social Charter.99 Some countries constitutionalize their economic rights but try to avoid
the problem of judicial enforcement by explicitly describing them as goals that are not
legally enforceable.100 This method avoids the worst of the judicial enforcement problem,
but loses the benefits that come with having claims be justiciable, namely that violations
can be forcibly rectified by the justice system. Without the teeth of an enforcement
provision, these goals risk being ignored completely. The Indian Constitution notably
follows this approach and can be seen as representative of this method of
constitutionalizing welfare rights. Part IV of the Indian Constitution is titled “Directives
Principles of State Policy,” and it many of the second-generation rights found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are included as directive principles.101 The
notable difference with the Indian Constitution is that these directive principles are
explicitly not judicially enforceable. The second provision of this section of their
Constitution reads, “The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any
court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the
governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in
making laws”102. While economic rights are elevated to the status of Constitutional text,
their actual legal status is that of unenforceable goals.
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Of particular note, is the post-apartheid South African Constitution which tries to
split the difference on the judicial enforcement question. Their Constitution created
legally enforceable economic rights with the caveat that fulfilment of those rights was
contingent on available resources. For instance, Chapter Two, Sections 26(1) and (2) of
the South African Constitution reads “(1) Everyone has the right to have access to
adequate housing (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right”103. In a
significant ruling on the meaning of these provisions, Government of the Republic of
South Africa v. Grootboom, the Constitutional Court of South Africa fleshed out the
duties of the government under the economic rights provisions of their Constitution,
“This is recognized by the Constitution which expressly provides that the state is not
obliged to go beyond available resources or to realize these rights immediately. I stress
however, that despite all these qualifications, these are rights, and the Constitution
obliges the state to give effect to them. This is an obligation that courts can, and in
appropriate circumstances, must enforce”104. The genius of this approach is that it
recognizes that resource constraints exist and are legitimate, while also still providing the
economic guarantees the legitimizing force of a constitutional right. This approach is
notable because it directs the government to take action, in this case creating a program
of emergency housing, but doesn’t place the judiciary in the role of explicitly defining
that program. On its own, that still seems to encounter the difficulty that the judiciary is
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engaged in policy priority setting, but the innovation is that the Constitutional Court
explicitly recognizes the constraints that the government is operating under and
consequently gives them latitude to work under. Through this approach, claimants retain
the ability to challenge the government when they fail to provide the minimums
guaranteed by economic rights, without turning democracies into tyrannies of the
judiciary.
As we’ve seen, normally critics of the constitutionalizing of welfare rights
question the capability of the judiciary to enforce positive rights. However, there is
another argument against explicit constitutionalizing which comes at the problem of
judicial enforcement from the complete opposite direction. Proponents of economic
welfare rights could find themselves in a situation where a conservative leaning judiciary
interpreted rights of minimal subsistence as invalidating the current instruments of the
welfare state. In this scenario, the flexible and means agnostic nature of economic rights
would seriously harm the agenda that welfare rights proponents want to advance. Positive
and judicially enforceable rights are dangerous because the effective content of that right
is left up to the interpreting agent. Frank Cross makes this argument in specific terms by
taking up the example of minimum wage laws driving down employment, “A
conservative judiciary might use these findings to conclude that minimum wage laws had
the effect of increasing poverty, rendering them illegal under consequentialist positive
rights”105. While this outcome is obviously speculative and dependent on a specific
makeup of the high court, it isn’t so farfetched as to be unbelievable. This argument also
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is helpful for illustrating the serious risks that come with placing enforceable positive
rights in the hands of the judicial system. For every effective South African approach, it’s
easy to envision another situation where the consequences of specifically enforceable
economic rights are more harmful than helpful.
The South African method remains the newest innovation in the field of
constitutionalizing economic rights, but there remains a second path for implementing
economic rights which doesn’t even touch constitutional text. This is the so-called “small
c” approach which Roosevelt favored for the implementation of his Second Bill of
Rights. Under this implementation plan, economic rights would exist as the commitments
of a democratic people, rather than explicit constitutional claims that are the province of
the judiciary. While these claims don’t have the force of constitutional text, they have the
force of broad acceptance by the people of a state. They are constitutional in the sense
that they are fundamental commitments, and they are perhaps stronger because they do
not come with the baggage of “big-C” constitutional commitments. In the American
context, the best example of “small-c” commitments are found in the Declaration of
Independence. Though it is a revered document in our political tradition, it doesn’t have
the force of laws behind it. Despite that lack of explicit authority, no American would
deny that our government could not deny us the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. The Declaration sets out guiding principles that our greatest statesmen draw
upon to justify and explain their actions. Indeed, Roosevelt himself harked back to the
Declaration in his Second Bill of Rights speech. Before listing his new economic rights,
he began with an homage to the claims of the declaration, “This Republic had its
beginning, and grew to its present strength, under the protection of certain inalienable
46

political rights—among them the right of free speech, free press, free worship, trial by
jury, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. They were our rights to life and
liberty” 106. Though he lists protections from the Bill of Rights, he understands them as
securing the broader principles of life and liberty from the Declaration. On this view the
Constitution is simply an instrument for fulfilling the larger commitments that were made
in 1776. Roosevelt continues on to mirror the phrasing of the Declaration again as a lead
in to his Second Bill, “In our day these economic truths have become accepted as selfevident”107. The Declaration of Independence clearly loomed large in Roosevelt’s
thoughts as he proposed a Second Bill of Rights, and he undoubtedly felt there were large
similarities between his proposal and that of the bold rebels some 168 years before. Both
were revolutionary statements of intent, but neither was intended to have the force of
constitutional law.
Sunstein calls the sort of “small-c” commitments that Roosevelt proposed
“constitutive commitments,” and he defines them as such, “The founding document does
not refer to them, and it is not seriously argued that they are encompassed by anything in
the Constitution. But these rights are nonetheless constitutive commitments. They have a
special place in the sense that they are widely accepted and cannot be eliminated without
a fundamental change in social understanding”108. Constitutive commitments are usually
implemented through legislative action, and they come to be accepted and supported on
the same level as true constitutional rights. As an example of constitutive commitments,
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Sunstein discusses social security, “another example, perhaps the simplest, is the right to
social security. The Constitution does not mention this right, and public officials are
permitted to disagree about how to respect it. But it is widely agreed that the nation is
committed to the social security system in some form that fundamentally protects the
economic expectations of its beneficiaries”109. Roosevelt himself is quoted saying to his
aides on the topic of social security taxes, “We put those payroll contributions there so as
to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and
unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my
social security program”110. He clearly understood how a right could be guaranteed
politically without having to go through the official constitutional process. The
constitutive commitments approach is worthwhile because it allows for a degree of
flexibility that explicitly constitutionalizing economic rights would preclude. The
commitments approach leaves room for the legislative process, and it relies on building
consensus in society around the ideas it promotes. Roosevelt understood the lasting
power of a societal consensus, so it was on that level that he tried to promote his Second
Bill.
Constitutive commitments ultimately experience the same sorts of difficulties that
judicially enforceable positive rights do. Their strengths are also their weaknesses. While
explicitly protected economic rights allow citizens to use the courts to enforce their
access to the positive goods, they also risk the judiciary acting contrary to the will of the

109

Sunstein, Second Bill of Rights, 62.
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: Volume III The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2003), 308-309.
110

48

people or ineffectively implementing the welfare rights. For constitutive commitments,
their reliance on consensus of the people and avoidance of constitutional text gives them
flexibility in implementation and wide popular support, but the indeterminate bar for
what qualifies as a constitutive commitment seems to muddy its utility as an actionable
concept. Randy Barnett criticizes constitutive commitments on these grounds, “The
existence of a constitutive commitment adds nothing to normative discourse over what
our basic political commitments ought to be, which is what normal political discourse is
all about” and in less academic terms, “The assertion of a constitutive commitment
amounts to the very conventional claim that ". . and lots of people agree with me!"” 111.
Barnett’s argument is that constitutive commitments lack of defined form or function is
not sufficient to justify them as the groundbreaking devices that Roosevelt (or Sunstein)
take them to be. On this view, such commitments lack any character beyond that of a
normal political argument with broad support and trying to define economic rights
through such instruments would be a gross misusage of the idea of rights.
Both approaches have their issues and their benefits, and either would work as a
method for implementing economic rights. In most situations, which method is used will
depend on the political situation at the time of implementation and the legal history of the
country.
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Chapter Four: Economic Rights for Today and Tomorrow
The preceding chapters of this thesis have given an explanation of economic
rights, taken a deep look at their zenith in American politics via Franklin Roosevelt’s
Second Bill of Rights speech, and then examined the two main theories on how economic
rights could be implemented. Drawing on history and the works of other authors, I’ve
tried to lay out a fair account of economic rights and their place in the American political
tradition. To conclude this work, I’d like to offer my own brief take on a modern
economic bill of rights, along with the rationale behind it.
The purpose of economic rights is not to secure an equal distribution of wealth in
a society. As was noted in Chapter One, the idea of explicitly economic guarantees on the
level of rights is one with support from the whole political spectrum. On the far left,
economic rights could necessitate total state control of the economy and the dismantling
of the capitalist system. At the opposite end, classical liberals could see economic rights
as primarily securing property and providing an absolutely basic minimum for members
of a society. My own vision of economic rights falls somewhere in between those two
poles, with a bias towards the left in their terms of their extent but the right in terms of
how they should be secured. The extent of the rights would be wide reaching, meaning
that they would encompass a comprehensive suite of basic goods. Rather than focusing
on property rights to the exclusion of other economic factors, there should be a focus on
specific guarantees of economic stability. In terms of implementation, the constitutive
commitments approach is most appealing because of its flexibility and popular support.
By focusing on the broader public consciousness and the legislative process, rights
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become a part of the fabric of society rather than a constitutional diktat. This method also
allows for a variety of mechanisms for putting economic rights into practice, and the
legislative process allows for all possible strategies for implementation to be weighed and
heard before selecting one. An economic rights approach isn’t could look like a state
driven planned economy, a social democracy, or a limited state with a few key constraints
and programs. The economic engine of the unfettered market economy is a powerful tool
for improving people’s lives, and through some state action it can be harnessed to lift up
those on the bottom rungs of society. A modern economic bill of rights should learn from
the successes and failures of the New Deal era. The implementation of a scheme of
economic rights doesn’t require a reheated alphabet soup of federal government agencies.
Provision of robust system of basic needs and protecting the conditions that allow people
to improve their lot in life beyond that should be the role of the government. To that end,
this is a potential modern economic bill of rights:
Right to employment
Right to social security for the elderly, the infirm, and the handicapped
Right to healthcare, food, and housing
Right to education
Right to information
In substance, it’s mostly composed of rights that have been seen before. The right
to employment was a key part of the guarantees that Roosevelt proposed in the aftermath
of the Great Depression. A promise of a guaranteed job was a way of ensuring many of
the other economic rights, because through the income provided by work individuals
could secure for themselves the other basic necessities of life. One particularly forceful
advocate for the right to employment was Martin Luther King Jr. The famous “March on
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Washington,” which culminated in the famous “I Have a Dream” speech was actually
called “The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom”112. Though the civil rights
struggle of the 1960s is mostly remembered for its celebrated victories in the realm of
desegregation, King and other leaders of the movement saw the right to employment as a
crucial feature of achieving substantive racial equality. 113 The right to employment was a
fix to the problem of structural unemployment among racial minorities. In effect, it’s
similar to a universal basic income, but with jobs associated with the payments.
Fulfilment of this right would be possible through encouragement of increased private
employment but guaranteeing a job to all citizens would probably also require the
government to act as an employer of last resort for people who couldn’t find any work in
the private sector.
The right to social security should also be familiar. Roosevelt promised a right to
adequate protection during old age, and this right would be a codification of the programs
we have that provide for the elderly today.114 Sunstein notes that, effectively, this right
has already been accepted as a constitutive commitment by the American people. 115 As a
provision in a modern economic bill of rights, this would serve as a concrete commitment
to maintain, and perhaps even expand, programs for the security of the elderly and infirm.
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The right to healthcare, food, and housing is an amalgamation of the most basic
actual goods that individuals require to live their lives. Healthcare is perhaps the most
politically salient topic on the entire list, and nearly every 2020 Democratic presidential
candidate can be quoted saying “Healthcare is a human right”116. On the provision of that
right, they are split, but the basic idea that healthcare is a right remains. Food and housing
are other simply understood basic necessities which people in a modern society should
have access to. A right to housing would be a strong statement about the persistent
scourge of homelessness, and it would give housing advocates a strong tool with which to
push for housing for all people.
The right to education is another which has been vindicated as a substantive
commitment by the people of the United States. While it hasn’t been explicitly
constitutionalized, 44 state constitutions do guarantee a right to education, and public
education has the same noncontroversial political status as social security. 117 The reason
for including an explicit right to education in this modern economic bill of rights would
be to codify and support the existing status of education. By making it a guaranteed right,
it could also act as a tool by which advocates could agitate for higher quality education.
The final right I propose is one that is entirely new, a right to information. A
modern economic bill of rights should take up modern issues, and the right to digital
privacy is one of the most pressing issues of the day. Although the right to privacy,
historically, has been recognized as a first generation right, the modern incarnation of the
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privacy problem seems to have a different character. The violators of digital privacy are
often nonstate actors, and they collect information that in many ways is the property of
individual citizens. The protection of that data, and the provision of it to citizens would
entail the kinds of government action that make it an active guarantee rather than a
negative protection. The right to information would help secure the people’s political
liberty by giving them autonomy in the digital space where they increasingly spend their
time.
Taken together, I think these rights would constitute a strong suite of economic
rights for the modern democratic citizen. Although, I’m partial to the constitutive
commitments approach to implementation. The South African model and the Grootboom
decision demonstrate how explicit constitutional guarantees could also work well. Either
manner of implementation would be a strong step towards guaranteeing the economic
preconditions of political liberty. To again quote Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
“Necessitous men, are not free men,” and we will not live in a truly free society until our
constitutional structure reflects that truth.
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